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I

to sit, conscious that anyone was
USED to be embarrassed when I had
looking at me, and listen to specimens of introductory oratory such as
we have just heard, and as I have heard
sometimes before when I have been introduced, until some years ago when I
tried to sit on the bench in a city to
the east of us and did not decide a case
to the satisfaction of the populist
newspapers and they compared me to
Pontius Pilate. There isn't anything
that anybody has ever been able to say
about me since that time that has
given me the slightest concern!

When the American Bar Association
met in London three years ago we were
told over and over again that we were
there in virtue of the common blood,
and the common institutions and the
common speech. Yet some of us began
to reflect and as we looked somewhat
at the real members of the American
Bar Association there present we could
not but be conscious that that common blood had been considerably diluted on this side of the water; and
when we came to look into the common institutions we could not but
notice that beginning about 1700, be-
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ginning after the revolution of 1688,
the common institutions had diverged
very considerably. And as to the common speech, well we understood our
English Brethren, and they understood
us in a measure, but when we found
that nearly every one of them carried
in his pocket a dictionary of Americanisms, and when some of us were
privileged to look at that dictionary,
and found among other things that it
defined a "jag" as an umbrella, we began to suspect that even the common
speech had diverged considerably since
our separation from the mother country!
And so if you will look at the proceedings of that meeting you will
notice that in the later days of the
meeting the speeches all dwelt upon
the common law as about the only
thing that we could find really that we
had in common. That led me, after I
came back, to think about this co-ainon law.
There does seem to be such a thing.
If you go into any reasonably complete law library there are of course
volumes of black letter, which no one
can read any longer; there are rows
of text books in crumbling law sheep
binding, covered with dust; there are
old reports accumulating dust, all of
which in their time formed a part of
the law as it stood at some given date
in some given place.
And yet out of all that welter of legal precepts and statutes obsolete and
obsolescent-out of all that welter
there does seem to arise something
that gives unity to English speaking
peoples; that makes us conscious of
living under one law with England and
Canada and Australia; and that makes
us conscious of a certain continuity,
not merely with Blackstone's time, not
merely with the classical law, shall we
say? of the seventeenth century, of the
time of Lord Coke or even the great
worthies of the middle ages, Choate
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and Bryan and Fortescue. And if we
call that common element which gives
this unity and continuity to the law
of English speaking peoples, if we
call it the common law, or if we give
it its medieval name of the law of the
land, I suppose there is oo phenomenon of our social or political history
that is so significant as the persistence
and the vitality of that law of the land.
It has come into competition at one
time or another all over the world with
its great rival the modern Roman law
system.
I suppose only historians
know that the custom of Paris was
once law in Michigan and Wisconsin
and Illinois. Look at the map. The
map bears abundant evidence that.
those states were once French territory, and yet I suppose there is not a
mark upon the law of those jurisdictions to suggest that they were ever
anything but common law jurisdictions
Take Florida. Florida was once a
domain of the Roman Spanish law, and
there are remnants of Spanish architecture there today to remind us that
that was once a part of the domain of
Spain. And yet there is not even a
word in the law of Florida to suggest
that it ever was under any other than
the English common law.
And take the domain where we are
today, carved out of the Louisiana purchase. Outside of Louisiana where is
there anything to suggest that this was
ever any other than a common law domain? The map shows that the French
voyageur and Spaniards reached here
or hereabout, but there isn't anything
in the law books to suggest it.
And even in Louisiana, where they
have the civil code, that I suppose is
almost literaly translated from the
French civil code, the whole departments of the law have become, as you
might say, Anglicized. Their whole
law of torts has become our AngloAmerican common law, and outside of
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family law and the law of inheritance
and a few things in the law of property, Louisiana itself is pretty nearly
a common law jurisdiction.
But it is not only in respect to place
and geography, that the common law
has shown that persistence and that
vitality. At one time or another in its
history, it has come into competition
with the strongest social and political
forces of the time and it always has
come out victor.
Go back to the very beginnings of
our common law, in the twelfth century. The common law came into conflict there with the Church, the most
powerful force in the middle ages, and
in the Constitutions of Clarendon there
was a compromise between the common law and the law of the church,
and a wonderful compromise it was, a
compromise that gave to the common
law everything that was significant in
the administration of justice between
Englishmen and Englishmen.
Later, at the time of the Tudors, the
movement that swept over western
Europe in the reception of Roman law
made it look for a time as if the
Roman law might prevail even in
England. But it did not. England
alone of the countries of Western
Europe resisted that movement and retained the law of the land. And later,
with the Stuarts, the common law
again came in conflict with the strongest force of the time, the doctrine of
passive obedience and absolute power,
or the desire for absolute power, on
the part of the Stuart kings. Again
the common law marched triumphant
and imposed upon those kings the
dogma that the king ruled under God
and the law.
Come to our own legal history. After
the Revolution the common law again
came into conflict with the strongest
force of the time, the rising tide of
Jeffersonian democracy. The common
law had to contend with the odium of
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English origin. Things English were
looked on with disfavor; things French
were in favor at that time. The common law was under suspicion because
of its doctrine as to the obligation of
contracts, that were not popular with
the great population of debtors after
the Revolution; and this doctrine of
the supremacy of the law and judicial
power was not looked upon with favor
by those who conceived of the legislature as most immediately responsive
to the popular will.
Yet the common law prevailed.
Its
supremacy
remained
unquestioned
through the nineteenth century.
And now, within
of us, again with
legislation, at the
present century, the

the memory of all
the rise of social
beginning of the
common law came

in conflict with the strongest force of
the time.
Almost forgotten, I suppose, are the days of agitation for recall of judges and recall of judicial
decisions, that threatened the doctrine
of supremacy of the law and the fundamental notion of an independent judiciary. Yet there again the common
law definitely triumphed and imposed
even upon sovereign peoples its doctrine that they too rule under God and
the law.
We seem therefore to have something very real, very tangible, here,
that gives unity and consistency to the
law and to the legal institutions of
English-speaking peoples, that gives
continuity virtually from the middle
ages to the present.
And yet, when we try to put our finger on something definite, and say,
"this
is that common law," I venture
to think we shall find it very elusive.
What is it that gives to the institutions of English-speaking peoples this
unity, consistency, continuity? What
is it that makes the English lawyer,
the Canadian lawyer, the Australian
lawyer, the American lawyer, conscious
of living under the same system?
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Well, certainly it is not that we have
got a body of legal precepts in common. We have only to look at the
statute books in the different Englishspeaking jurisdictions, or even the
statute books in our 48 different states,
to see that that is not true. And if
you turn to our reported judicial decisions, you quickly find that diversities in geography and social and political conditions have given rise to a
wealth of diversity in legal precepts.
Take one example that I would like
to adduce on this point. In Oklahoma
the personal property of a deceased
passes to his heirs. In England the
real property of a deceased person
passes to his personal representative.
And yet England and Oklahoma are
both common law jurisdictions.
There is not, then, any continuity
to legal precepts, nor any consistency
or unity of legal precepts.
I had occasion some years ago to
look into the reports for 150 years,
from 1774, the declaration of rights of
the Continental congress, to 1924. And
I found that you could not put your
finger on a single decision in the reports of 1774 and say, There is a proposition that obtains as a bit of living
law actually governing the everyday
administration of justice in the United
States today.
What do you find in those reports?
Why, they are filled with the minutiae
of procedure for imprisonment for
debt, the minutiae of procedure for
the settlement of paupers, the minutiae
of proceedings in real actions-and
how many of you here know what a
real action is?-and the many details
of the old eighteenth century common
law procedure. There is just one decision in the reports of that year on a
point of bills and notes, and it is not
in any way significant, it has reference
to a custom that is as dead as the dodo.
It is not then in any common body
of precepts that we are to find this
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common law. Well, I can imagine
your saying, We knew that long ago;
it is not that they are common precepts, but there are certain common
principles, certain principles that obtain wherever English law has followed English speech, and they set off our
common law from the Roman law of
the whole world. Well, one should like
to think so; but it is pretty hard to
find them. You can put your finger on
certain principles, but the moment you
do that you are likely to find that they
are common not merely to the Englishspeaking world but to the whole world.
There are a certain number of principles of universal justice that obtain
wherever
justice
is
administered
among civilized men, and we haven't
any patent on them in common law
jurisdictions.
When you get beyond those principles you will find it very hard to put
your finger upon anything. I had occasion not long ago to turn to the
great book of the law in the days of
Henry VIII, where there are several
pages of what are called customs, fundamental common law propositions,
and there is not a single one of them
thaf we recognize today. Turn to that
oracle of our common law, Sir Edward
Coke, in the reign of James I. Look at
what he calls principles, the authority
or premise for judicial reason, and
they are so scholastic, so pedantic, so
out of touch with what we regard as
realities that they simply make you
smile. There is not a proposition there
that you can say with assurance is a
distinctive,
characteristic,
common
law principle.
Well, one might say, those are not
significant
things,
the
significant
things are institutions, and there are
certain
institutions t h a t prevail
wherever the English law has been in
force, and there are three institutions
that occur to each of you instantly
when we speak of common law institutions, the doctrine of precedents, the
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doctrine of the supremacy of the law
and trial by jury.
.Now I should like to think that there
we have three characteristics, universal, fundamental and eternal, of common law institutions, and if you could
let it go at that I think we would all
be well satisfied; but the moment you
begin to look into it you get an uneasy feeling even there.
Take the doctrine of precedents;
that has been relaxing considerably
in our practice in this country for 150
The theory is that a single
years.
decision has the authority of law. But
has it? Look at the long list of overruled cases in any of our states, and
ask yourself if single decisions actually have the authority of law with us.
The fact of it is we have been relaxing our doctrine and they have been
expanding theirs until we are very
much alike all over the modern world.
Well, you say, there is the supremacy
of the law. The late Professor Dyer of
Oxford wrote a book in which he did
seem to demonstrate that there is a
fundamental, universal, peculiar common law institution, and of course we
carry it to its legal extreme in our
doctrine of judicial power over unconstitutional legislation. But I was
considerably astonished not so long
ago to find that a Roman (Dutch)
court in South Africa had reached the
identical conclusion on the basis of
Justinian's Digest and Commentaries
of Modern Roman law. A court in
Roumania not so long ago reached the
identical conclusion on the basis of
Roman law authority.
But as I say, we have carried it to
the extreme in our doctrine of judicial
power over unconstitutional legislation, which is not admitted in England.
Roman law authorities and Roman
law technique sometimes afford a like
conclusion to men who do not know
how to use and do not have access to
our American authorities.
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Well, you say, there is trial by jury;
we have always recognized in that a
peculiar, characteristic, fundamental
common law institution. Yes, but the
civil jury is almost extinct in England,
and one cannot study American legislation without being conscious that the
civil jury shows signs of being moribund in this country.
amendLegislative constitutional
ments are continually encroaching upon the common law institution of trial
by jury, and I can conceive that much
may happen to it in the next generation. In the generation to come we
shall not be so sure that there is a
fundamental, eternal, peculiar common law institution.
Take the one matter of cases that
call for expert opinio'a evidence. There
is pretty strong pressure from our
brethren in the medical profession to
introduce quite a different element into
cases involving expert testimony, and
I can see that there may be a considerable infusion of the inquisitorial as
distinguished from the controversial
in our trial procedure.
But let us suppose that we have a
certain residuum of precepts, of forms
and of institutions which are fundamental, characteristic common law institutions, we must notice that that
residuum seems to be under attack today from more than one point.
First, of course, you will think of
legislation. Well, legislation in a way
is not so alarming in that connection.
Legislation is administered by judges
trained in the common law; it is interpreted by common law canons of interpretation; it is developed with a
common law background, and it deals
with particularly isolated situations.
You see it does not, after all, involve
great danger to the unity or consistency of the common law. And then
anyhow legislation is apt to be a little
like the hurry of the Frenchman's
time when he said he made himself
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years.

I like to think of a statute that may
be found in the old statute books of
Indiana. There was an old time surveyor in Indiana who was usually
called as an expert in land cases, and
he did not like to carry out long columns of figures, so he always figured
pi as 3.14, which was good enough for
most cases. But in came some rather
smart young man who had been trained in more modern methods, and he
used longer decimals, and began to
figure pi as 3.14159, and the old man
got into difficulties with his expert
evidence. And he was very indignant
about it, and he got himself elected to
the legislature, and he got enacted a
statute which was upon the statute
book for some years fixing, authoritatively and officially and iegally for the
state of Indiana the value of pi at 3.14!
Well, you see the unity and continuity of law is not in great danger from
that sort of thing; and that is true
enough. But when you come to examine modern legislation more critically
its destructive and corrosive possibilities prove to be very considerable.
I spoke of one point. I spoke of
legislation in Great Britain, whereby
the realty of a deceased person passes
not to his heir but to his personal representative. And they have gone further. In Great Britain today all assets in land are either fee simple absolute or terms for years. I think you
will feel that it is "going some" when
you come to reflect on what that involves. Ninety-nine years from now,
when these estates have been resolved
by their terms parliament is going to
have to get very busy unless the courts
in the meantime do something that
the legislative draftsmen did not provide for.
Take the crimes which are enacted
in every session of the legislature
without requiring a guilty mind. run-

RECORD

ning counter to every fundamental
proposition of the common law that
crimes involve a guilty mind. Take
the statutory negotiability, going cotinter to the common law proposition
that a ma. can only convey what he
has got. Take the statutory liens, of
which we have a wealth nowadays,
that have upset almost overnight what
a common law lien was. On every
hand you can see what we have taken
to be fundamental common law dogmas
undermined by legislation.
Take another institution that is
growing up with great corrosive and
destructive possibilities, namely, administration. Now I would not decry
administration for a moment. It is
required by the circumstances of our
life in an urban industrial society of
today. We have got to have a certain
individualization and the application
of rules.
It was all right in the days of the
lumber wagon to say to the farmer,
You navigate your wagon with due
care; if you don't you will have to
But
answer for the consequences.
when it comes to the day of motor
vehicles upon our highways today, you
cannot leave the matter to the ex post
facto judgment of a jury after the
event. You have got to tell the people
by white lines and yellow lines and
mechanical agencies, and even by the
agency of policemen wigwagging at
the corners, where to go and where not
to go, and when to go and when not
to go.
It is the same way in the conduct of
enterprises. We cannot lay down abstract rules for the abstract conduct
of abstract enterprises. We have got
to tell the great enterprises what they
can do and what they cannot do at
this juncture and that. So that whether we will or not we have got to expect this administrative element in
our polity.
I was talking to a physician about
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this the other day, and he said, Yes,
we are having the same experiences in
medicine; when I came into the medical profession we used to treat the
heart, the lungs, the liver, the stomach; our books told us how and we
knew the way in which to treat them.
The patient came to us; we found the
difficulty to be with his heart or his
lungs or his liver or his stomach, and
we treated his heart or his lungs or his
liver or his stomach accordingly. But
now, he said, we have learned to treat
the concrete John Doe or Richard Roe
whose heart or lungs or liver or stomach are not functioning as they should.
And it is that same tendency to individualize that is going on in every
department of human activity that we
are having to reckon with in the law.
Yes, I grant that. I am not the least
alarmed about it.
But consider its
legal possibilities for a moment.
What is it that differentiates an
administrative tribunal from a common law tribunal? Why, isn't it thaf
the administrative
tribunal treats
every situation as unique, as unrelated
to any situation that ever went before
it or that shall ever come after it? It
seizes upon the unique features of the
situation. It treats the case by itself,
unrelated to any other, past, present
or future.
The common law treatment of a controversy, on the other hand, tries to refer the essential features to some type,
to some principle of action, and to
deduce a decision accordingly.
In the very home of the common
law, at Westminster, a little more than
ten years ago the House of Lords decided that in an appeal to an administrative appellate tribunal from an
administrative officer, it was not necesssary for the administrative appellate tribunal to observe what it supposed were the ordinary decencies of
judicial appellate system. The House
of Lords held that if the administra-
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tive appellate tribunal chose to decide
a case on the secret report of an inspector sent down to look over the
situation, without anyone knowing
who he was or what he was doing, and
to act on that report without the appellant having an opportunity to spe
it, to know its contents or explain it
or refute it or meet it by argumentif the appellate tribunal chose to proceed in that manner, the only qiuestion
that the House of Lords could ask was,
Did it treat everybody else in the same
way? If that was its ordinary method
of procedure; if it applied to all litigants, there could be no complaint,
even though that ordinary procedure
was the procedure of Harun-al-Rashid
by way of relieving the tedium of
royal ennui through the administration of justice.
Well, you 'see that is England; and
queer things have been happening in
the old country. We have known for
some time that some legislation has
been pretty socialistic; and I suppose
the courts have got to go that way
next.
And look at our own country the
very year that this case was decided
in the House of Lords. It happened
that a workman employed by the
Knickerbocker Ice company in New
York came home one evening in a
rather dilapidated condition. He was
nervous and shaky, white, had no appetite for his supper, and when his
wife asked him what was the matter
he said that the boys had been putting
in some ice at the basement of Hogan's
place and a 300 pound block of ice
had slipped and fallen on him and
shaken him up pretty badly. He got
n'obetter; 'his wife sent for a physician, to whom he told the same story.
The physician looked him over,' and
sent him to the hospital, where he
died at one o'clock the next morning
of delirium tremens.
As this fatality obviously grew out
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a proceeding before the workmen's
compensation commission for the statutory compensation.
The evidence
before the commission showed beyond
question that there was not a bruise
or an abrasion or a scratch or a mark
upon the body. The testimony of those
who had been at work with him was
that during the whole day he had been
neither upon the ice wagon nor the
water wagon! but that he had that day
in the interior of Hogan's place laid
the foundation of the fatal attack that
took him off the next morning. But
the statute said that the commission
in awards under the act was not to be
governed by the technical rules of evidence, and it made a highly technical
rule of evidence that there needed to
be no causal connections between the
putting of ice into that cellar and the
fatality; and having before them the
testimony of the physician and of the
widow as to what the deceased had
said, the Board -apparently actuated by
a desire-shall I say to distribute the
economic surplus?-looking by this
case by itself as a controversy between
the widow and the ice company, made
an award distributing the economic
surplus.
The Court of Appeals of New York
found itself very much embarrassed in
dealing with that case, because while
It had this evidence before it the question of fact was for the board, and so
long as it proceeded upon the question
of evidence as it was in the habit of
proceeding upon it, and dealt with this
case as it dealt with other cases, where
was there power in the court to turn
itself into an administrative body and
to apply purely legal technicalities to
things that were within the province
of this administrative board?
Well, you see there are corrosive and
destructive possibilities for the common law in these administrative commissions.

Let us look at another thing that is
going on. You would not expect to
see anything of this nature in the
treatment of controversies creeping
into judicial decisions. The art of the
common law lawyers' craft, however
technical in using legal materials, has
somehow managed to keep a very considerable uniformity and consistency
in the decisions of the courts of our
48 states. And yet there are 48 of
them, and there are nine circuit courts
of appeal, besides the Supreme Court
of the United States, each within its
sphere-shall I say with a mouth
speaking great things?-empowered to
lay down the universal, eternal common law in its particular jurisdiction.
And this tendency to individualize
seems to be creeping in at more than
one spot. Let me give you an example.
I suppose if there is anything that we
should have agreed upon a generation
ago, it was that a parent is not responSible for the child's torts. Also we
should feel that one is not responsible
for what another does unless that
other is an agent acting within the
scope of his agency.
Well, that was clear enough in the
old horse and buggy and lumber wagon
days. If little Willie took out the
family horse and buggy on a frolic of
his own, he was not likely to be able
to hurt much of anything except the
horse and buggy and himself; the public at large were in no great danger.
And so it seemed perfectly clear that
unless the parent was at fault, or unless Willie was engaged in his father's
business and within the scope of that
business, that there was no liability.
Then came the advent of motor vehicles. When little Willie takes out
the family automobile there are great
possibilities of danger, and that situation has given us pause, and in more
jurisdictions than one the judicial doctrine of the family automobile has
risen to deal with that situation.
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Now I do not say that you are to explain those decisions on the ground
that the ownership of a Ford indicates
such affluence on the part of the owner
that distribution of the economic surplus comes into account, and yet one
cannot read some decisions without suspecting that that does enter into it.
But I will be a little more charitable,
and suggest as a principle, Qui facit
per auto facit per se!
But seriously you see what I mean.
That tendency to individualize, that
tendency to treat a case as unique, to
think of it not in terms of x and y
but to think of it as the Knickerbocker
Ice company on the one side and Mary
Doe on the other, is showing itself in
every department of our legal activity.
Now I am not putting up a sign of
distress and saying that our legal
and political and social institutions
are in danger, because I do not believe
it.
If you look at legal history you will
see that there are periods of stability
and there are periods of growth. And
in periods of growth for a time we
have to grow through trial and error,
and when we are doing things through
trial and error there is very likely to
be a considerable percentage of error.
There isn't any danger to our institutions in those things, and yet isn't
there very grave danger of our losing
the continuity and the unity that has
seemed to be characteristic of the law
of English speaking peoples in the
past?
Well, what shall we say? Is there
nothing but history behind the law of
English speaking peoples? Have we
nothing in common with the English
and the Canadian and the Australian
but a certain common legal terminology? Is it true after all that there
isn't any fundamental, eternal, universal law of the land?
They tell a story of the great Bishop
Wilberforce, who when he became

RECORD

Bishop made a resolution that he
would visit every parish in his diocese. In the course of carrying out
that resolution he came presently into
one remote parish where there was
an old fox-hunting parson who mum,
bled through the service hurriedly on
Sunday morning and then got on his
horse and went about the more serious
pursuits of life; and the Bishop naturally was shocked, and he said, "This
won't do; we must have some spiritual
life in this parish." "Yes," the parson
said, "I thought so too when I came
here 40 years ago, but 40 years of life
in this parish tends to disabuse one of
ideals of that sort." But the Bishop
said, "That won't do; that won't do at
all. I will come down here next Sunday and I will preach and I will show
you what you are to do."
So the Bishop came down and
preached as only he could, one of those
characteristic magnificent sermons of
his, on the text, "The fool hath said
in his heart, there is no God." After
the service the parson said, "Now we
will see what the parish think about
it." So he sent for Hodge, a representative of the fine old English farmer, to come up and be presented to the
Bishop. And Hodge came up with his
cap in his hand, very much embarrassed, and was presented to the Lord
Bishop. "And now," the parson said,
"tell the Bishop, Hodge, what you
think of the sermon."
And Hodge
said, "My, it were a powerful sermon
-it were a powerful sermon. And do
you know, My Lord, I can't help thinking there do be a God, after all!"
Well, I cannot help thinking that
there do be a common law after all.
And I am going to suggest to you
where I think it is that we are to find
it. I think our whole difficulty in a
discussion of this sort is in assuming
that law is simply an aggregate of
laws; that if you have two thousand
rules of law, adding them together you
have law. I do not believe it. Legal

THE

DENVER

BAR ASSOCIATION

precepts are an element in the law but
they are a relatively transient and
fleeting element. There are at least
two other elements that we have got
to take into account. One is, if I may
put it so, the art of the lawyer's craft,
the technique of the lawyer; that technique whereby he finds the grounds of
decision in authoritative legal materials; that art of his craft whereby he
develops rules for new situations out
of a body of rules made for quite different situations; that art of his craft
whereby he can eke out a constant and
reconstructive development so as to
make them into a living law for the
administration of justice in a time and
place. And then in addition to that
technique of which I speak, there is a
body of received ideals, ideals of what
the social order should be, what the
legal order should be, and consequently what the rules and principles, what
the legal precepts, ought to be. Those
received ideals are the whole background of everything that the judge
and that the lawyer does. He projects
his question upon that background and
he fills in the details according to that
picture.
Now if you look at those elements of
the law you will see that the element
of legal precept, as I said, is a relatively fleeting one. If you think of the law
of today I suppose you will think
almost instantly of contracts and torts.
Look at Blackstone's Commentaries
and see how much you will find there
of anything that we call contracts
today. It is all about contracts under
seal. The first text book upon torts
was written in 1859, and as late as
1874 a reviewer argued that there
wasn't any such thing. And if we
take contracts and torts as the significant parts of the law I need not remind you that the subject that bulks
largest in the reports today is taxation, and you cannot find that in the
reports of a generation ago.
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The life of these precepts is not
much more than a generation. What
was the first book that came out of an
American law school? It came out of
Judge Reeves famous school at Litchfield, Connecticut, and was a treatise
on the law of Baron and Fief. What
was the next book that came out of
an American school? It came out of
Harvard law school, and its title was
a Treatise on the Law of Real Actions.
There may be some lawyers here who
were brought up on Blackstone and
know what real actions are, or were,
but I suspect most of them skipped
that part and turned to the parts that
were more relevant to the affairs of
the day.
If we go back into the reports, as I
said, they are filled with settlement of
paupers, imprisonment for debt and
the minutiae of the old common law
practice, but where are the snows of
yester year? When you come to the
element of received ideals, they are
more permanent, and yet they change.
If anyone doubts that let him turn to
our classical books of the seventeenth
century where the picture is still that
of a feudal, relatively unorganized,
society. Today our ideals have been
affected by the random organization
under which we live, by the ideals of
the French revolution, by the democratic ideals of the nineteenth century,
by the identification of the immemorial
common law rights of Englishmen with
the rights of man. They are radically
different ideals, and although these
ideals change slowly, we think they are
changing, as at least suggested by the
not infrequent five to four decisions
on questions of social legislation in
the Supreme Court of the United
States.
And when we come to the element
of the art of the lawyer's craft, the
technique of the common law lawyer,
there we find something doing. We
can xecognize that technique clear back
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into the Year Books; we can recognize it in England, In Canada, in Australia, in our forty-eight states, and
there is that same model of approach
toward a legal controversy, that same
mode of handling the legal materials,
that same sure motive and AngloSaxon tendency to lay hold of concrete
experience and apply it no further
than the circumstances of a concrete
controversy require.
When you turn to the modern Roman
law you find an utterly different technique, applying written texts.
He
looks for a universal proposition and
he proceeds by a process of deduction
from a universal proposition as laid
down or not laid down in third century Rome. His books of authority
are the ancient oracle; his treatises
are commentaries upon the written
law.
But the oracle of the common law
is a judge. The books of authority are
reports of decided cases; the treatises
are commentaries upon decided cases.
And there is something that lies back
of this technic that seems to me a
most significant thing, and that is the
frame of mind of the common law
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lawyer, the frame of mind that leads
him always to keep his eye upon experience, to think of legal problems, to
think of controversies in terms of experience, to seek his solutions not in
ambitious programs for laying down
universalities, but rather in a cautious,
slow but surefooted application of experience to the exigencies of justice
for the time being.
Now in that frame of mind, in that
point of technique of the common law
lawyer, is the spirit of the common
law. I suggest to you that it is our
most precious legal and political, and
possibly social, possession; and isn't
it the duty of the common law lawyer
to see to it that in spite of the destructive and corrosive possibilities of legislation and administration, this frame
of mind, this technique, is preserved,
is handed down, to remain a living
instrument of justice among English
speaking peoples?
Reported for the Record
thru the courtesy of
C. P. Gehman
Shorthand Reporter
Denver, Colo.

Recent Statutes
By HENRY McALLIsrm, EsQ.

General Assembly in providing
HE
of the act
of the 1927
for wisdom
a "legislative
reference
office", designed to supervise the drafting of laws and the prevention of foolishly conceived and phrased statutes,
finds support in another act passed at
the same session, House Bill No. 321,
"by Representative Hill (by request)",
being "An Act to amend Sections 5162
and 5164 of the Compiled Laws of Colorado, 1921".
Section 5162 of the Compiled Laws

had been operative some twenty years,
and gave satisfactioi. It provided a
method of determining hirship to
real property in intestate estates, at
a minimum of trouble and expense, by
the filing of a petition therefor at any
time before order for final settlement
and inclusion of notice thereof in the
notice of final settlement. Section
5164 prescribed the effect of the decree upon heirs and their grantees.
The new act purports to extend the
proceedings to Inheritance of personal
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property as well as real estate, and it
may be that this is sometimes advisable, though the chief object of such
statutes is to settle title to land. The
act further provides that the petition
may be filed at any time before the
order for final settlement. Such an
order may be entered practically four
weeks before the date for final settlement, so as to permit the publication
for that period. But, after this provision, the act says that the court
shall fix a date "not less than six weeks
from the date of such order", and shall
cause a notice to be published for four
weeks, and to be mailed to non-resident heirs at least six weeks, before
the hearing. Furthermore, the result
is that where the petition for determination of heirship and the petition
for final settlement are filed on the
same day, the day fixed for final settlement must be at least six weeks in
the future.
As usual, the hypocritical practice
is followed of adding both the emergency clause and the safety-clutch, so
that the act.took effect upon its approval (March 26, 1927). The session
laws have not yet been published, and
it is doubtful whether many attorneys
are advised of this change in the law.
Of course, no emergency in fact existed and obviously the law was not
necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and
safety.
Since the present law relative to administration of estates was enacted in
1903, scarcely a session of the legislature has passed without amendments
thereof and instances might be cited
of amendments of the same section
time and again, sometimes at intervals of two years, only. Apparently
an attorney has a case not covered by
existing law or out of harmony with
it, and he has a statute passed to meet
his "emergency" regardless of its inconsistency with other provisions, and
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without expressly repealing them.
Soon, the law is again amended or a
new statute is enacted to fit another
case, and so on ad infinitum. As a result our estate laws are in hopeless
confusion on some subjects, and no
sooner does a lawyer accommodate
himself to a certain procedure than
another legislature repeals all he
knows. On the very question of determination of heirship, does the new
law repeal Compiled Laws, Sections
5165 and 5166, themselves enacted at
a different session from the new
amended Sections 5162 and 5164, and
relating to the same subject? If it
was the intention of the draftsman
that they should be repealed, why did
he not expressly provide, rather than
leave the same to the unsatisfactory
expression "all acts and parts of acts
in conflict herewith are hereby reThere is serious question
pealed."
whether the 1921 Compiled Laws do
not contain a number of sections relating to estates which were repealed
prior to their publication.
Finally, as to the emergency clause
and the safety-clutch, no more valuable service may be performed by the
new legislative reference director than
to discourage the use of these provisions, especially in statutes designed to change existing procedure in
courts or elsewhere, where, in fact, no
emergency or "immediate preservation of the public peace, health or
safety" can possibly be involved. The
danger that such statutes will be subjected to referendum (an iniquitous
procedure which is now practically
nullified by resort to a bare-faced
falsehood) is negligible. Those who
are called upon to conduct proceedings in courts or to advise clients, are
entitled to know (or, at least, to have
convenient access to means of knowing) what the practice is, and should
not be compelled to grope in the dark
for months intervening the adjournment of the legislature and the pub-
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lication of tle session laws, and then
be confronted with a statute completely revising procedure made immediately effective by these devices.
A recent conspicuous example is the
"Act concerning real property and to
render titles to real property and to
interests and estates therein, more
safe, secure and marketable".
This
act contains many admirable provisions and no objection is made to its
substance, but it is submitted that it
was not, as stated, necessary for the
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immediate preservation of the public
peace, health and safety, nor was
there any great emergency.
The legislative reference office cannot be a complete panacea, but if the
director appointed be a lawyer of
character, experience, independence,
capacity for hard and careful labor,
and above all possessed of proper
ideals and enthusiasm for his work,
and not a mere lame-duck who needs
a job, he can be of great aid to the
public and the bar.

Re: ColoradoRiver Waters and the Santa Fe
Compact
By FRED S.

CALDWELL, EsQ., OF THE DENVER BAR

ultimately confirmed by the
ILL the Santa Fe Compact, if
seven states and Congress, divest said states of their present sovereign power to grant appropriations of
water for use in the generation of
electrical power and vest that governmental function in the federal government exclusively?
The Compact does not undertake to
define the term "agricultural use", evidently upon the theory that it is so
well understood as to make definition
unnecessary. But "domestic use" is
defined to"include the use of water for
household, stock, municipal, milling, industrial and other like purposes, but shall exclude the generation of electrical power."
And following this is a provision (Art.
III, (e)) imposing an express inhibition upon all the seven states in these
words:
"The States of the Upper Division
shall -not withhold water, and the
States of the Lower Division shall

not ?require the delivery of water,
which cannot reasonably be applied to domestic and agricultural
-uses."

Although this inhibition is expressed
negatively its obvious meaning is this:
The states shall not have the right to
withhold or require the delivery of
water for "the generation of electrical
power."
But, although the states cannot withhold or require the delivery of water
for "the generation of electrical power", it is contemplated and intended
that the water shall be used for such
power purposes. Art. IV. (b) expressly provides that:
"Subject to the provisions of this
Compact, water of the Colorado
River System may be impounded
and used for the generation of
electrical power", subservient only
to the "dominant uses for agricultural and domestic purposes."
Now to "impound and use" said
water for the generation of electrical
power
necessarily
constitutes the
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withholding and requiring of the water
for that purpose, and this the states
cannot do because they have expressly
divested themselves of all right to
"withhold" or "require the delivery of
water" except for "domestic and agricultural uses", which uses are expressly defined by the Compact to exclude
the use of the water for "the generation of electrical power".
Under these circumstances it would
seem that a permit from the State of
Colorado, or from any of the other six
states, would be a very insecure and
uncertain foundation upon which to
base an appropriation of water for use
in "the generation of electrical power". Obviously, if under the express
terms of the Compact the states have
no right to withhold or require water
for the generation of electrical power
they cannot by issuing a permit to appropriate confer upon the appropriator
any such right.
If the foregoing reasoning is correct
it follows that by the final adoption
and approval of the Santa Fe Coinpact
the states would divest themselves of
their present sovereign right to control by grant, subject only to the indirect limitation that the navigability
of that part of the stream which is in
fact navigable must not be impaired,
the use of the water of the Colorado
river system for the generation of
electrical power. And such sovereign
right to control the use of said waters
for the generation of electrical power
would thereafter be vested in the Federal Government exclusively.
Of course the question here raised,
viz., the right of the states under the
Santa Fe Compact to grant and control the use of the waters of the Colorado river system for the generation
of electrical power, is not involved in
such water power as may be developed
by direct diversion from the flow of the
stream without any storage reservoir
for withholding purposes; but the Government surveys and reports show that

RECORD

the possibility for such power development is very small, so small in fact as
to be insignificant. But by making use
of storage reservoirs so designed as
to develop to the maximum the agricultural uses of said waters, the Government investigators estimate that
three power sites in northwestern Colorado can be made to generate continuously, the year around, 122,400
"Brake Horse Power" of electrical current; and that nine power sites in
Utah can be made to generate 396,960
B. H. P. of hydro-electrical power.
These figures do not include any of
the hydro-electrical power now developed, but refer exclusively to undeveloped power sites. And it is estimated
that five power sites in Arizona will
produce 1,746,750 B. H. P. But the flow
of the Colorado river system is not
sufficient to supply all these power
sites. And if the Santa Fe Compact
is confirmed and made operative Colorado and Utah will have nothing whatever to say about the development of
their hydro-electrical power sites, but
must content themselves with whatever they are able to get thru the
grace of Congress and the Federal
Power Commission.

Playing Favorites
A Scotchman, not feeling so well as
usual, called on his family doctor, who
looked him over and gave him some
pills to be taken at bedtime. Whisky
was also prescribed for his stomach's
sake, a small glass to be taken after
each meal.
Four lays later Sandy again called
on the doctor, stating he was feeling no
better.
"Have you taken the medicine
exactly as I instructed?" the doctor
inquired.
"Weel, doctor," replied the patient,
"I may be a wee bit behint wi' the pills,
but I'm six weeks ahead wi' tha
whusky."-Boston Post.
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An "Illustrated"Sentence
Judge Benedict is that told relaROBABLY the best anecdote of
tive to his sentence of death pronounced upon one Jose Maria Martin
-who was convicted of murder in the
District Court of Taos county, New
Mexico, under a state of facts showing
great brutality, and with absolutely
Judge
no mitigating circumstances.
Benedict said:
"Jose Maria Martin, stand up-Jose
Maria Martin, you have been indicted,
tried and convicted by a jury of your
countrymen, of the crime of murder,
and the Court is now about to pass
upon you the dread sentence of the
law. As a usual thing, Jose Maria
Martin, it is a painful duty for the
judge of a court of justice to pronounce upon a human being the sentence of death. "here is something
horrible about it and the mind of the
Court naturally revolts from the performance of such a duty. Happily,
however, your case is relieved of all
such unpleasant features, and the
Court takes positive delight in sentencing you to death.
You are a young man, Jose Maria
Martin; apparently of good physical
constitution and robust health. Ordinarily you might have looked forward
to many years of life and the Court
has no doubt you have, and have expected to die at a green old age; but
you are about to be cut off in consequence of your own act. Jose Maria
Martin, it is now the spring time; in a
little while the grass will be springing
up green in these beautiful valleys,
and on these broad mesas and mountain sides, flowers will be blooming;
birds will be singing their sweet
carols, and nature will be putting on
her most gorgeous and her most attractive robes, and life will be pleasant
and men will want to stay, but none
of this for you, Jose Maria Martin, the
flowers will not bloom for you Jose

Maria Martin; the birds will not carol
for you Jose Maria Martin; when
these things come to gladden the
senses of men, you will be occupying
a space about six by two beneath the
sod, and the green grass and those
beautiful flowers will be growing
above your lowly head.
The sentence of the Court is that
you be taken from this place to the
county jail; that you be there kept
safely and securely confined, in the
custody of the sheriff, until the day
appointed for your execution. Be very
careful, Mr. Sheriff, that he have no
opportunity to escape and that you
have him at the appointed place at the
appointed time. That you be so kept,
Jose Maria Martin, until-Mr. Clerk,
on what day of the month does Friday
about two weeks from this time come?
"March 22nd, Your Honor,"-very well,
until Friday the 22nd day of March,
when you will be taken by the sheriff
from your place of confinement to
some safe and convenient spot within
the county; that is in your discretion,
Mr. Sheriff,-you are only confined to
the limits of the county and that you
there be hanged by the neck until you
are dead-and-the Court was about
to add Jose Maria Martin "may God
have mercy on your soul", but the
Court will not assume the responsibility of asking an All Wise Providence
to do that which a jury of your peers
has refused to do. The Lord couldn't
have mercy on your soul. However,
if you affect any religious belief, or
are connected with any religious organization, it might be well enough
for you to send for your priest or your
minister and get from him-wellsuch consolation as you can, but the
Court advises you to place no reliance
upon anything of that kind. Mr. Sheriff, remove the prisoner."
(Contributed by W. J. McPherson,
Esq., of the Denver Bar).
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Recent Trial Court Decisions
(Editor's Note.-It is intended in
each issue of the Record to note interesting current decisions of all local
Trial Courts, including the United
States District Court, State District
Courts. the County Court, and the Justice Courts. The co-operation of the
members of the Bar is solicited in making this department a success. Any attorney having knowledge of such a
decision is requested to phone or mail
the title of the case to Victor Arthur
Miller, who will digest the decision for
this department. The names of the
Courts having no material for the current month will be omitted, due to
lack of space.)

In the County Court

years after the delivery of the deed
(July 1, 1921), is barred by Sec. 6397
C. L. 1921, which provides that "all
personal actions on any contract not
limited by the foregoing sections, or by
any other law in this state shall be
brought within three years after the
accruing of the cause of action and not
afterward".
Held:
low)

For appellant (Defendant be-

Reasoning: While there are no written pleadings, this is really an action
in covenant; the six year statute of
limitations not applying in an action
of this kind, the all-embracing statute
quoted above is applicable.
Hayden
et al v. Patterson, 39 Colo. 15; Fisher
v. Cathcart, 3 Colo. 374.
Barry v. Croke No. 67781

HON. G. A. LUXFORD, JUDGE
Facts: June 1, 1921, defendant conveyed to plaintiff a certain lot by warranty deed, warranting the premises
to be free and clear of all liens and incumbrances, except an incumbrance of
$1500 due October 6, 1922. Also the
general tax of 1920. At the time of the
execution and delivery of the deed,
there was a tax or assessment of the
East Denver Park Improvement District which was a lien on said property, but which was not mentioned in
the deed.
On January 12, 1925, after demand
by plaintiff upon defendant to pay this
tax, and the latter's refusal so to do,
plaintiff paid it.
On June 18, 1925, an action was commenced in the Justice Court to recover
of defendant the amount of this tax so
paid by plaintiff. Upon judgment for
plaintiff, defendant appealed to the
County Court.
Defendant urges that the action having been commenced more than three

Bar Library Note
The librarian of the Bar Association
Library in the Court House states that
many attorneys are becoming lax in
withdrawing volumes from the Library
without signing up for them in the
book kept for that purpose, and that
a number of valuable volumes have
been lost or misplaced. All of the
books of the Library are marked "Denver Bar Association Library" and any
attorney having any of these volumes
can easily identify them.
Members of the Bar are again requested to assist in returning these
misplaced volumes and are urged
hereafter to cooperate in the conduct
of the Library, which is maintained
at a considerable expense for the
benefit of the members of this Association.
If you have any such volumes in
your office, please call Mrs. Bangs, the
librarian, at Main 1142, and the books
will be sent for.

THE

DENVER

BAR ASSOCIATION

RECORD

Note-The Denver Bar has developed a Wit In Walker
and now produces a Poet In Perry.

The Posthumous Song of a Calf
BY HAROLD W. PERRY, ESQ., OF THE DENvER BAR

When I was born my noble dam a chattel mortgage wore,
Acknowledged and recorded as per statutory lore,
And 'ere the stork which brought me had begun its homeward flight
The mortgagee hired counsel to protect his legal right.
The lawyer said a mortgage was not known at common law,
Was a creature of the statutes and must never have a flaw,
For those robbers and highwaymen, called Third Persons at the bar,
Would otherwise acquire a lien. the Courts would hold was prior.
This mortgage covered offspring, which apparently meant me,
And thereupon the lawyer gravely warned the mortgagee
Re: latent eccentricities of mine-that should be curbed
In order that the mortgage lien might never be disturbed.
I swiftly passed from calfhood and in time became a steer
And after three brief years of life my late demise drew near;
But through those years that lawyer ne'er did let his client pause
Always to keep that mortgage in compliance with the laws.
But when a packer bought me and had hung me up to cool,
Third Persons, please see supra, asked a certain Judge to rule
An action in replevin was quite timely and indeed
Under all circumstances was a writ then much in need.
But while the Judge was hearing counsel in this legal strife,
My choicest loin was purchased by the learned Judge's wife;
And when the meat of the debate he went home to digest,
He did the job more thoroughly than even he had guessed.
He brought home counsel with him and the litigants as well,
That at his board the cares of suit he might somewhat dispel;
They dined upon said choicest loin, not knowing it was mine,
And after they had gorged themselves, all said that it was fine.
Next day Judge had the sheriff the replevin execute,
But the sheriff couldn't do it 'cause the most of me was moot;
He served the order on the Judge who'd thereto signed his name,
Demanding back my choicest loin, or double bond for same.
Then Court judicial notice took that quite as if by chance
An equitable adjustment had been had by litigants;
And to the learned counsel the Judge's words were these:
"This case is settled out of Court; see intra for your fees."
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Kate P. Mace Exercises
On July 29, 1927, in.the Court Room
of the County Court, Denver, Colorado,
this Association held a testimonial reception in honor of Miss Kate P. Mace,
Chief Deputy Clerk of said Court and
an employee of said Clerk's Office for
forty-six and one-half years continuously.
President Robert L. Stearns presided at these Exercises, which were attended by approximately one hundred
fifty members of the Bar and friends
of Miss Mace.
Former Judges Ira C. Rothgerber
and Grant L. Hudson sat with Judge
Luxford.
Judge Luxford in opening the proceedings stated that the Court would
stand aside for a time to give place to
the Denver Bar Association in doing
honor to one who had served in that
Court for nearly half a century. He
then placed the meeting in charge of
Robert L. Stearns, President of this
Association.
Mr. Stearns explained the purpose
of the meeting, calling attention to the
long time Miss Mace had served in the
Clerk's Office. He then called upon
Judge Luxford for a few remarks on
behalf of the Judges of the Court, who
said in part:
"The probate law in this state has
been written and rewritten since Miss
Mace began here. She has occupied
every place in the County Court, every
single office, except Judge and Court
Reporter and Bailiff, and I am not altogether sure that before this Court
House was built that she and Charlie
Reitler didn't perform all three of
those functions.

al.

Capable, courteous, industrious, loyIn all the coming time, when de-

votion to .public cause is to be illustrated by example, Miss Mace's name
will be placed at the head of the list.

From whatever standpoint you view
it, she, at all times, has filled the requirements. Hers has been the perfect service. Her record of a half century in this court stands out as a cube
of solid sunshine."
Mr. Stearns then introduced Judge
Shattuck, who represented the former
Clerks of the Court and joined in expressing appreciation of Miss Mace's
courteous and efficient service.
Mr. Stearns then introduced Mr.
Doud, who spoke on behalf of this Association, in part, as follows:
"To me has been granted, upon this
unique occasion, the happy privilege
of extending to our guest of honor,
Miss Kate P. Mace, the felicitations
of the Denver Bar. As lawyers we
have always called her just Kate
Mace.
For nearly half a century, as has
been repeatedly stated this morning,
you, Kate Mace, have held an honorable and responsible position as one
of the clerks of this County Court.
That you have efficiently performed
your duties is proven by the fact that
you have been continued in office for
such a lengthy period of time-a period of time that is without a precedent or parallel in the State of Colorado, and it is doubtful if there is a
During
precedent like it anywhere.
the time that you have been Clerk,
men of different political views and of
different political faith have been
judges of this court, but you have
of
Irrespective
remained.
always
whatever political party was in power,
your position was always secure.
The past rises before us as we think
of the many judges whom you have
served. Of those departed, we can see
the faces of B. F. Harrington, George
W. Miller, Owen E. Le Fevre, Robert
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V. Steele and John R. Dixon; but
among the living we have the former
Judges, Ben B. Lindsey, Grant L. Hudson, Ira C. Rothgerber, and the present
incumbent, George A. Luxford. May
the days be long and many before
those now living shall be counted
among those who have left us!
It has been my privilege to practice
probate law before you for more than
All the lawyer
forty-three years.
guests, here assembled, have enjoyed
the same privilege, but perhaps for a
shorter time. In the practice in this
court, all these members of the Bar
who have possessed any wisdom at all,
have often come to you for instruction,
direction and advice. When one has
been puzzled over some question of
practice or has been at a loss to know
how to proceed, it has almost become
a proverb among us to say "Ask Kate
Mace." We have a well grounded suspicion that the judges of this court
have even called upon you for information. Some of us have a still further suspicion that it might have been
as well for them, and better for us,
had they adhered more closely to the
proverb, "Ask Kate Mace."
At this time, as a token of our appreciation, and high regard, the Denver Bar Association presents to you as
a memento by which you may remember us, this beautiful gift-a white
gold, diamond dinner ring. No matter
how white may be the gold, or how
pure may be the diamond, in our estimation, this ring will be less of an
adornment to your person than you
have been to the office from which you
now retire.
Perhaps as the last word of advice
that we may give, we should say- that
if any one else seeks to present you
any kind of a diamond ring- Kate
Mace-be careful!
With the wish that upon you for the
remainder of your days the re may rest
the benediction of Heaven, and that
those who follow you may strive to
emulate your fine personality, unblemished character, and splendid service,
we say to you as one of the Clerks of
the County Court-we say it very tengoodbye,
derly and affectionatelyKate Mace, goodbye."
Mr. Stearns then introduced Judge
Rothberger, who said:
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"I am about to read a tribute that
has been prepared for this occasion.
In the course of a very short time this
will be engrossed handsomely, I know.
I recall having received in this sam't
room some six or seven years ago a
similar document which was similarly
engrossed, and which I cherished as
my fondest and proudest possession,
and this I am sure you will so cherish
when it is so delivered to you. It reads
'Upon the occasion of the retirement
of Kate P. Mace as Deputy Clerk of
the County Court, the Judge and fori4er Judges of the County Court and
the Clerk and former Clerks of the
County Court, together with the members of the Bar of the City and County
of Denver, Colorado, take this means
of expressing their appreciation of her
long and devoted public service.
Miss Mace's term of office as Deputy
Clerk of the County Court spans al.
most half a century. She has served
continuously and without interruption
for a period of forty-six and one-half
years. A lifetime in the public service
is in itself a notable achievement. Bur
in the performance of her duties she.
has gained the admiration, respect and
highest esteem of all of the member.,
of the Bar and the public generally.
The conscientious and efficient dis.
charge of her duties covers a period
embracing the terms of 9 County
Judges and 6 Clerks of the County
Court. Her devoted service has in a
large measure contributed to the effective administration of the work o
the Court. Her helpful counsel has
guided many young lawyers into a
thorough knowledge of probate procedure. Her friendly assistance has
gone out to widows and orphans in the
bewildered hour of their bereavement.
Judges, clerks, lawyers and laymen
unite in expressing their gratitude and
their respect to one who has honored
and dignified the public service by a
lifetime of consecrated effort.'
The tribute is signed by the Denver
Bar Association by Robert L. Stearns,
President, and by Albert J. Gould, Jr,
Secretary. It is also signed by Mr.
A. L. Doud, Chairman of this committee, and by Grant L. Hudson, Judge of
the County Court, July 3, 1907, to December 1, 1908, and by myself as
Judge, January 14, 1913, to January 11,
1921, and by Judge Luxford, judge
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since January 11, 1921, and we hope
for a longer time.
By E. F. Dunlevy, Clerk of the Countv Court, January 10, 1893, to July 1,
1q97; by Hubert L. Shattuck, Clerk of
the County Court, February 1, 1898, to
May 1, 1901, and by Mr. Bonfils with
whom you have been associated so
many years and who has been Clerk
of the County Court since May 1,
1901."
Mr. Stearns then called upon Miss
Mace, who very graciously expressed
her thanks for the cooperation, good
will and friendship of the members of
the Bar during her long tenure of offiee.

Don P. Blackwood Fund
On June 30, 1927, President James
A. Marsh forwarded to the Pueblo Bar
Association this Association's check
in the sum of $85, which reimbursed
the Pueblo Association in full for
money paid in connection with the
expenses of the funeral of Don P.
Blackwood.

RECORD

Ten Dollars thereof was paid out of
the general fund of this Association,
and the following members contributed the balance of this fund:
Barker, Lindstrom and Webster
Bartels and Blood
Wilbur F. Ilenious
Dines, Dines and Holme
Ewing and Arnold
Gillette and Clark
Hindry, Friedman and Brewster
William E. Hutton
Henry McAllister
J. A. Marsh
Pershing, Nye, Tallmadge and Bosworth
Ponsford, Pender and Larwill
Smith and Brock
Henry W. Toll
Van Cise and Robinson
A London magistrate has pointed
out that in French law an actor is not
entitled to a Christian burial. In this
country, on the other hand, some actors
are more than entitled to it.-Punch.

I

T'FOR
RENT
I

Every Stenographic Service
Promptly Attended to at Any Time

I

Office inAttorney's Suite I
I1

i

409 Equitable Building

I

I

Reitler and Woodman I
Certified Shorthand ReportersNOTARIES PUBLIC

.[

"

Phone Champa 2260
Suite 416 Empire Bldg.
Denver, Colo.

4

,-.

i

Ralph B. Mayo & Company
Certified Public Accountants

I

Established 1914

FOSTER BUILDING

DENVER, COLORADO

Audits-Financial Investigations-Income and Estate Tax
Accounting-Systems

i

CHAS. H. SCOTT
President

EDWARD WHITLEY
Treasurer

TE RECORD ABSTRACT COMPANY
725 Eighteenth Street
DENVER

Complete Abstracts of Title
To all Real Estate in

DENVER
ADAMS
and

ARAPAHOE COUNTIES

TELEPHONES MAIN 1208 AND 1209

~I1

fi

THE ATTORNEY

for
THE ESTATE

IT

is the established policy of the undersigned
banks that the attorney designating a bank in
a fiduciary capacity, shall act as attorney for
the estate.
INTERNATIONAL TRUST Co.
UNITED STATES NATIONAL

BANK

AMERICAN NATIONAL BANmK
COLORADO NATIONAL BANK

DENVER NATIONAL BANK

Mm

